Blueford v. Arkansas

On February 22, the Court will hear oral argument in Blueford v. Arkansas, concerning the application of the Double Jeopardy clause to a case in which the jury deadlocked on a lesser-included offense but unanimously voted against the greater offense.

Alex Blueford was charged with capital murder. Blueford was left with the two year old son of his live-in girlfriend  while she went out. Shortly thereafter, Blueford took the child to the hospital, he had sustained massive trauma to the head and was in cardiac arrest.  Blueford stated at the hospital that he did not know the cause of the injuries but that the child had been jumping around his room beforehand. The state at trial argued that Blueford had purposely abused the child by slamming him into the floor.

The jury could deadlocked on the lesser-included offenses of manslaughter and negligent homicide, but determined that he was not guilty of capital murder and the lesser-included offense of first-degree murder. Specifically, after the jury was unsuccessful at agreeing in deliberations, the trial judge asked them the ratio of votes for each offense.

After the court declared a mistrial, Blueford filed motions before the court, arguing that the statements of the jury during their colloquy with the trial judge constituted an acquittal as to the two greater offenses. The trial judge denied Bluefords motion after stating that, although the jury unanimously voted against the offenses “there were no ‘findings’ or ‘verdicts’ as intended by the law. The jury was unable to complete its deliberations and this Court had to declare a mistrial.”

The case revolves around the Supreme Court’s test for permitting subsequent prosecution after court has declared a mistrial. Retrial is permitted only in cases of “manifest necessity,” which a deadlocked jury is ordinarily considered to have created.

The Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed the lower court, holding that a deadlocked jury constituted grounds to permit a subsequent prosecution regardless of the additional circumstances here. The court stated that “it is axiomatic that a judgment is not valid until entered of record … a judgment rendered in open court is not controlling until entered or filed of record … the mere reading of the jury’s verdict in open court does not constitute an acquittal.

The court further recognized that “a general verdict is not actually required to be in writing, but may be announced orally.” But stated that: “[h]ere, however, the jury forewoman was not making a formal announcement of acquittal. She was engaged in a discussion with the circuit court about the jury’s deliberations and the jurors’ inability to agree on a verdict. Thus, this is a not a situation where a formal verdict was announced or entered of record.”

Before the Supreme Court, petitioner Blueford advances three reasons that the Double Jeopardy Clause acts to block subsequent prosecution on the capital and first degree murder charges. First, that the Court, in United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co. has previously held that “what constitutes an ‘acquittal’ is not to be controlled by the form of the … action.” But by whether it “actually  represents a resolution … of some or all of the factual elements of the offense charged.” Second, that deadlock on a lesser included offense in and of itself establishes acquittal on the greater offenses. Petitioner relies on cases in which the court has implied verdicts from jury action, as where a jury returns a guilty verdict as to two charges but is silent on a third, which was the case in Green v. United States.  Third, that there are no “extraordinary circumstances” justifying permitting subsequent prosecution as to the greater offenses because the jury did not deadlock as to those offenses. 

 The State puts fourth four arguments. First, that this is a simple case of a deadlocked jury and the statements by the forewoman were a mid-deliberation colloquy that did not amount to a verdict. Second, that the jury forewoman’s declarations lacked the assurances required of a verdict. There is no confirmation that her statements actually represented the votes of the jury. Furthermore, her statements occurred mid-way through deliberation, at a point after which many juries alter their votes, especially where, as here, the trial court had encouraged the jury to attempt to reach a unanimous verdict. Third, this circumstance did not constitute an implied acquittal because the fact that the jury deadlocked on manslaughter does not establish that they completed their deliberations as to the greater offenses. Respondent distinguishes those cases of implied verdict cited by Blueford on the grounds that in those cases there was some form of express verdict by the jury, whereas a deadlocked jury provides no verdict whatsoever. Fourth, the petitioner waived any challenge to the court’s sua sponte declaration of a mistrial by failing to object at the time. Thus, the petitioner is “essentially arguing that the Constitution mandates partial verdicts, and, thereby urges a striking and unjustified departure from the longstanding practice of requiring only general verdicts in criminal cases.”